My former boss, who was cool enough to give me the long leash required to do the TSCTP Study when I was at the Center for Complex Operations, just released PRISM Volume 5, Number 2. This issue is the journal’s first African security-focused one, and includes the following articles:
- The Tswalu Dialog by Michael Miklaucic
- On the State of Peace and Security in Africa by Olusegun Obasanjo
- Emerging Risks and Opportunities in Sub-Saharan Africa: Implications for the American Agenda of Peace and Security, Democracy and Governance, Economic Growth and Development by Jeffrey Herbst & Greg Mills
- Security Threats Facing Africa and its Capacity to Respond by Paul Collier
- Shaping Africa’s Peace and Security Partnerships for the 21st Century by Amanda Dory
- Upcoming Inflection Point by Phillip Carter & Ryan Guard
- The Recurrent Security Crises in Mali and the Role of the African Union by Pierre Buyoya
- Dynamics of Conflict Management in the Democratic Republic of the Congo;
Malawi and the Force Intervention Brigade by Clement Namangale
- Somaliland: Where there has been Conflict but no Intervention by Rakiya Omaar & Saeed Mohamoud
- Lessons from Colombia for Fighting the Boko Haram Insurgency in Nigeria by Afeikhena Jerome
- The African Development Bank’s Support to Post Conflict States by Sunita Pitamber
- The Soldier and the Street by Marie Besançon & Stephen Dalzell
(Originally published in The Washington Post’s Monkey Cage Blog on February 5, 2015)
Since the beginning of the year, two developments have revived hope that South Sudan’s civil war, which began in December 2013, may soon come to an end. First, the country’s main political party, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM), whose split precipitated the conflict, announced its reunification during an Intra-SPLM Dialogue hosted in Tanzania. President Salva Kiir and his former vice president and current leader of the SPLM/A-in-Opposition then signed anAgreement on the Establishment of a Transitional Government of National Unity at the mediations sponsored by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). While both of these processes are necessary to address SPLM party governance and possible power-sharing arrangements, they are not yet sufficient enough to make the signing of a final peace agreement a foregone conclusion.
(Read the rest of the article on The Monkey Cage Blog website)
First of all, let me confess that I’m an idiot. I arrived in Juba a few days ago, and today, 15 December, is the one year anniversary of the start of South Sudan’s civil war. I’ve been asked if I did this on purpose, and told that I was traveling in the absolutely wrong direction. But I needed data to complete my summer research on the disintegration of the military integration process and this is the week I was able to travel. Alas…
National Courier has a good synopsis of the first week of what’s still called the “December Crisis” – even though it quickly spiraled into a civil war that engulfed much of the country.
Agence France-Presse captured the impact of the war in South Sudan: A Year of War, in Numbers, with figures such as:
– Est. 50K dead (although no official death toll kept)
– 50% of population in need (2M homeless, +6M in need of aid)
– Over 610K refugees, mostly hosted by Ethiopia, followed by Uganda, Sudan, and Kenya
– 12K forcibly-recruited child soldiers and 400K forced to quit school so facilities can be used as barracks
– 100K civilians sheltering in UN camps
– Over $20M spent on first 6mos of peace talks (in luxury hotels in Addis)
– Over $38M spent on arms
– Five different deals and cessations of hostilities that have collapsed within days
– Three leaders sanctioned by EU and US (rebel chief Peter Gadet, and army commanders Santino Deng and Marial Chanuong)
Last but not least, a small group of civil society volunteers have been collecting information on those who have perished in the war since the conflict began a year ago in “Naming the Ones We Lost” – South Sudan Conflict from Dec 15, 2013 to present day.” If the 50K estimate of war casualties is accurate, this list accounts for only 1% of those who have perished.
On that depressing note, the city is quiet for now – let us hope it remains so. Sadly, I can’t say the same for some of the areas in Upper Nile or Lakes – or considering rumors of rebellion brewing in the Equatorias.
Depending on what part of the world you live in, today is Remembrance/Armistice/Veterans Day. As a kid, I remember my mother telling us stories of my Trinidadian great uncle who fought for the Commonwealth during either World War I or World War II. (We’re still trying to figure out which one it was…) As a result, I’ve always been interested in learning more about the troops – outside of the major powers – that played a role in either World War.
Accordingly, I’d like to call attention to the WWI in Africa Project, organized by Jacques Enaudeau (@jacksometer) & Kathleen Bomani (@KateBomz) to shed light on an overlooked theater of World War I – Africa. You can find additional information on the project below:
- Website: http://wwiafrica.ghost.io/
- Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/wwiafrica
- Twitter: @WWIAfrica
The curators of the project have also written articles detailing their work, such as The World War One in Africa Project: What happened in Africa should not stay in Africa, WWI’s untold story: The forgotten African battlefields, and African resistance and rebellion: The other side of World War I.
All of the links I’ve included in this post will lead you to rarely seen photographs and histories of the role of Africa, and Africans, in World War I. I highly recommend taking a look to gain a greater understanding of the less mainstream aspect of the war. I’ve found it highly educational and hope you will too!
Was there or was there not a coup in Burkina Faso? The answer to that question is “Yes.” As of Monday, the United States was yet to determine whether the weekend’s events actually constituted a coup, which led to an interesting Egypt-circa-July 2013 exchange during the State Department’s Daily Press Briefing:
By calling for a civilian-led transitional government, the U.S. government appears to be following suit with the African Union (AU) and the Economic Community for West African States (ECOWAS), which have called for a return to constitutional order. (See the AU statement and the ECOWAS statements here and here.) Meanwhile, the military has been given a two week ultimatum to transition to civilian rule, and if this deadline is ignored, it might make the line between Coup and NotACoup clearer for regional and international actors.
My determination is that then-president Blaise Compaoré’s resignation on Friday should have set in motion Article 43 of the country’s 1991 constitution, which gives presidential powers to the President of the Senate in case of vacancy, until a new president is elected within 60 to 90 days. The fact that both Compaoré and the military’s Chief of Staff, General Honoré Traoré, had each dissolved the government last Thursday created ambiguity as to whether or not these stipulations in the eventually-suspended constitution could still be enacted after Compaoré stepped down on Friday. Regardless, I would argue that if a coup took place in the past week, it occurred when the Burkinabé military – through Traoré and then through Lieutenant Colonel Isaac Yacouba Zida – put themselves forward as the interim head of government, thereby ignoring the guidance laid out in the constitution.
On the U.S. side of things, if the determination is eventually made that there was a coup, the language in Section 7008 of the Foreign Assistance Act becomes relevant:
“None of the funds appropriated or otherwise made available pursuant to titles III through VI of this Act shall be obligated or expended to finance directly any assistance to the government of any country whose duly elected head of government is deposed by military coup d’état or decree, or a coup d’état or decree that is supported by the military: Provided, That assistance may be resumed to such government if the President determines and certifies to the Committees on Appropriations that subsequent to the termination of assistance a democratically elected government has taken office…”
If the military fails to cede power to a civilian-led transitional government, it will impact U.S. security force assistance to the Burkinabé military. State Department assistance would be cut off as a matter of law, and Department of Defense assistance would be cut off as a matter of policy until a transition to civilian rule.
Given the current level of uncertainty as to whether the military will indeed step down, I though it would be interesting to provide some relevant facts about the U.S. relationship with Burkina Faso’s security forces:
- One of the recent self-proclaimed leaders of Burkina Faso, Lieutenant Colonel Isaac Yacouba Zida of the Presidential Guard, received military training in Morocco, Taiwan, Canada, and Cameroon. As it turns out, he also received 17 days of U.S. military training in 2012: a 12-day counterterrorism training course at MacDill Air Force Base and a 5-day military intelligence course in Botswana funded by the U.S. government. (Recall that the leader of Mali’s 2012 coup, then-Captain Amadou Sanogo, participated in several iterations of U.S. training, including basic infantry officer training at Fort Benning, English-language training through the Defense Language Institute at Lackland Air Force Base, an intelligence course at Fort Huachuca, and study at the Marine Corps Base Quantico.)
- Burkina Faso was slated to receive $250,000 in International Military Education and Training funds, according to the FY14 Estimate and the FY15 request in the FY 2015 Congressional Budget Justification. Burkina Faso did not receive any Foreign Military Financing in these years. With 1,984 personnel (as of the end of September 2014) across seven United Nations peacekeeping operations, Burkina Faso is also a partner in the Africa Contingency Operations and Training Assistance (ACOTA).
- Burkina Faso has been part of the Trans Sahara Counter Terrorism Partnership since 2009. (Learn more about what DoD and non-DoD programs were taking place in Burkina Faso under TSCTP by reading The Trans Sahara Counter Terrorism Partnership Building Partner Capacity to Counter Terrorism and Violent Extremism).
- Burkina Faso has received Section 1206 (Counterterrorism Train & Equip) funding, but I don’t know how much & when. A number I have from my notes last year is $5.8M to support a CT company (100-150 soldiers) in the army. I was also told that the U.S. could only work with designated units in the military for TSCTP – the Presidential Guard and the 25th Parachute Regiment.
- Burkina Faso had been receiving the State Department’s Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA) since 2011, which covered hostage negotiation, crime scene investigation, surveillance detection, and airport security for the national police, gendarmerie, and customs. Burkina Faso also stepped up border security in response to the situation in Mali by dedicating a rapid-response counterterrorism company along its common border.
- Burkina Faso hosts a Joint Special Operations Air Detachment (JSOAD), which is mostly for airlifting logistics or casualties and providing Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) in the Sahel. (More info on the ISR part in the Washington Post. Note: these are not drones flying out of the JSOAD, but manned aircraft.)